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1. Introduction 
The passing reference in the Lisbon Treaty that “Union delegations in third countries and at 
international organisations shall represent the Union”, does not do credit to the major break with 
past practice that it causes.1 Previously, external representation only occurred through delegations of 
a single EU institution, the European Commission.2 For the first time in the history of European 
integration, the EU now disposes of quasi-embassies that represent, implement and defend the 
entire range of EU competences. These delegations, that constitute the EU’s eyes, ears and face on 
the ground, hold great potential. The Union’s global role indeed depends on the acceptance of and 
relations with third countries and international organisations, which are to a great extent made and 
developed in-country. In the most ambitious of terms High Representative Ashton professed, in one 
of her first media appearances since she took up the post, that these delegations should form “a 
network that is the pride of Europe and the envy of the rest of the world … It should offer our citizens 
added value to what their countries already do, and give our partners around the world a trusted and 
reliable ally on European issues”.3 
In this manner the bar was set high and, given their great potential, a lot is at stake to make these 
bodies work. In spite of all this, the creation of EU Delegations passed rather unnoticed in scholarly 
and public debate. All efforts and eyes were first put on erecting the new European External Action 
Service (EEAS) in Brussels, of which the EU Delegations form an integral part. Only recently, now that 
the EEAS is up and running for over three years, attention has started to shift to the field. This is 
mirrored in the greater focus on the Delegations in the 2013 Review of the EEAS by the High 
Representative.4 In sharp contrast to the initial inter-institutional infighting and the fierce criticism on 
the nitty-gritty of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, as well as its principal the High 
Representative, this gradually rising attention for the Delegations has not laid bare a similar jumble. 
Rather to the contrary, while it is generally agreed that a lot of work remains to be done, the EU 
Delegations are already being hailed as the “perhaps unintended”5 but “most conspicuous”6  success 
story of the new external action constellation.  
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The aim of this paper is to shed light on why this seemingly drastic rupture with past practice has not 
caused proportionate problems, as well as to understand the potential and challenges of these new 
EU Delegations. The approach will be two-fold. First, in a concise historic overview of the emergence 
of Commission Delegations, we will contrast their evolving legal framework to the actual practice on 
the ground. The aim is to clarify what kind of offices were exactly in place on the eve of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s ratification and how this came into being. This will help to understand whether the rupture 
was in actual fact as significant as a literal comparison of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties would suggest. 
Second, an analysis of EU legal documents, as well as a three month period of participatory 
observation in the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, have assisted in putting flesh to the bones of the 
Delegation’s rather void primary law status. Setting out the nature, competences and composition of 
these bodies will not only clarify their potential, but also their challenges, limits and room for 
improvement. In particular, these Delegations have overnight acquired an inherently political role for 
which their skills and expertise are yet to be fully brought up to the mark. 
2. The emergence of Commission Delegations: contrasting law and 
practice 
2.1. From Rome to Maastricht and beyond: misleading legal 
frameworks 
As many developments in the history of EU external relations, the emergence of Commission 
Delegations was not the result of forward-looking strategic thinking, but rather of a reactionary and 
pragmatic process driven by evolving needs. It was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the predecessor of the EEC, later EC and now EU, that opened a first foreign office in the very early 
days of European integration. In 1954, shortly after the inglorious demise of the European Defence 
Community (EDC), Jean Monnet decided to open an ECSC information office in Washington to 
convince the US government that Europe’s post-war project had not lost traction.7 Due to the 
significant global attention for the European cooperation experiment and the close links with global 
trade, this was soon followed by an ECSC liaison office for Latin America in Santiago de Chile and the 
opening of its first full diplomatic mission in London in 1956.  
The 1957 Rome Treaty had a mainly inward-looking focus and made no mention of any external 
representation. Yet, it included provisions on a common commercial policy and an association regime 
that set up trade preferences for and financial aid to a number of African colonial dependencies.8 For 
this latter purpose, the European Commission was tasked with the verification of aid projects, mainly 
targeted at large infrastructure works, financed by the European Development Fund (EDF). The highly 
technical nature of this assignment required on-the-spot presence of very specific expertise. 
Therefore, contract teams were set up in the associated states, led by a contrôleur technique that 
was generally recruited from a European engineering consultancy. After the whirlwind 
decolonization process of the early 1960s, that soon outdated the Rome Treaty’s association regime, 
this system was continued under the 1965 Yaoundé Convention. The aid modalities largely stayed 
the same, but they now fell under an association agreement between the EEC and independent 
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African states. Consequently, the EDF technical experts were increasingly perceived by their host 
governments as diplomatic representatives of the EEC and assigned with tasks that fell outside their 
formal terms of reference. This deficiency was addressed by creating the European Agency for 
Cooperation (EAC), a semi-autonomous non-profit organisation funded by the Commission in order 
to recruit and administer technical staff to man the EDF offices. These were led by controleurs 
délègues with limited representational responsibilities. Whereas this was a substandard solution 
from a diplomatic point of view, this was precisely the preference of most Member States that were 
keen to preserve their foreign policy prerogatives.  
The Commission’s role in trade negotiations incited the opening of more offices and gave them more 
weight. By the end of the 1960s it disposed of a limited global network of around twenty-five 
delegations covering four continents. This network was however not based on any legal framework 
or blueprint. The pragmatic development of these roots of European diplomacy, per definition 
targeted at projecting a coherent picture externally, resulted in an internally heterogeneous design 
where the various offices did not even represent a single EU institution but three separate 
Commission Directorates-General (DGs): press and information offices of the former DG Press (then 
DG X, now DG Communication), diplomatic missions of DG External Relations (then DG I) and the EDF 
offices of DG Development (then DG VIII). The first two were staffed by Commission officials, the last 
by contract agents. These DGS “often treated ‘their’ delegations primarily as an extension of their 
particular service, rather than as representing the institution as a whole”.9 
The DG I Delegations had the broadest task description, including advice and support to traveling 
Community officials, acting as contact points and information hubs on EEC aims and objectives, 
assisting in the execution of Community policy and cooperation agreements and encouraging 
cooperation and coordination with and between Member States diplomatic missions.10 Carrying out 
such functions tended to put Commission officials on the same footing with national diplomats, 
requiring similar protection and privileges. Consequently, these delegations sought and obtained, 
throughout the 1970s, full diplomatic status from their host country authorities, based on the 
privileges and immunities defined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). 
Although the latter limits membership explicitly to states,11 its regime was extended in the widest 
possible manner to Commission Delegations through bilateral establishment agreements.12 In legal 
terms, this could be seen as an act of piracy by the Commission, as the Council was never involved 
and Member States were presented a fait accompli.13 Yet it should also be noted that host countries 
were for the sake of clarity often requesting party for granting such a status, the more so since they 
had already diplomatically recognised the Community by accrediting their own ambassadors in 
Brussels. 
Due to the greater involvement of Member States under the Yaoundé Convention and the more 
technical nature of DG VIII offices, their battle to obtain a better status went less smoothly. The most 
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important step forward was the formal recognition of their existence in the 1975 Lomé Convention – 
Yaoundé’s successor – with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPs). This assigned the 
Commission Delegate (which was the new name for the head of mission) as the formal point of 
contact between the EEC and the respective ACP government, with considerable discretionary 
powers in approving and assessing technical cooperation contracts.14  The whole system was 
essentially anti-bureaucratic, based on personal relations and loyalty to a number of aid barons that 
set the course of EDF aid flows.15 
The next major change for European diplomatic relations emerged outside the Community 
framework with the creation in 1970 of European Political Cooperation as a form of 
intergovernmental consultation and coordination between EEC Member States. This not only 
increased interaction between foreign ministries, but also between their diplomatic missions abroad. 
While initially established as entirely separate from the Community, the impossible separation of 
political and economic aspects of external relations soon drew in the European Commission. This 
maturing involvement was acknowledged and strengthened in the 1981 London Report on EPC that 
fully associated the latter, at all levels.16 In Brussels this chiefly implied a silent seat at the EPC table 
that allowed the Commission to inform and be informed on potential EPC-EEC interfaces. The 
involvement of its network abroad was however considerably more intensive, where Member States 
– particularly the smaller ones with limited diplomatic resources – happily relied on its significant 
expertise in EC policy, as well as its institutional memory as the only steady force in the debilitating 
rhythm of ever-changing presidencies.17  
Consequently Commission Delegations became intimately involved with sensitive and confidential 
information in places where confidentiality and discretion was of the essence. Particularly with 
regard to DG VIII offices it became harder and harder for the Commission to justify the juridical 
anomaly of contracting staff to represent public authority through a private company registered 
under Belgian national law.18 Consequently, after a hard-won strife EAC staff was in 1987 elevated to 
the rank of Commission official.19 Moreover, the 1989 revision of the Lomé Convention provided that 
“the ACP States shall grant Commission Delegations privileges and immunities similar to those 
granted to diplomatic missions”.20  
The continued EU enlargement, whereby new Member States expanded the geographic interests of 
the whole, continuously prompted the opening of new Delegations. By the end of the 1980s the 
Commission, which was essentially the executive arm of a purely economically-oriented international 
organisation, disposed of 89 delegations around the globe, composed of 440 officials and 1440 local 
staff that have from the outset played a critical role.21 In the great majority of cases, Heads of 
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Delegation were moreover accredited at Head of State level, carrying the rank of ambassador, with 
their credentials signed by the President of the Commission.22 The Delegations got their next boost 
after the sudden demise of the Soviet empire, when a group of 24 Western states charged the 
Commission to coordinate their economic assistance to the central and eastern European countries 
(CEECs) under the major PHARE programme. This included the inherently political task of attaching 
and checking conditionality provisions.23 Many of these countries subsequently applied for EU 
membership, charging the Delegations with the crucial task of assisting in and coordinating the 
application of the acquis communautaire.  
This rising status was consolidated in the Treaty of Maastricht that accorded Commission Delegations 
their first formal primary law recognition. This Treaty moreover confirmed the political vocation of 
the European integration project by creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the 
successor to the EPC – as one of the three pillars of the newly created European Union.24 The CFSP 
remained a largely intergovernmental preserve where the boundaries were set by unanimity among 
Member States represented in the Council and the European Council, and with limited roles for the 
European Parliament and the Court of Justice (JHA). The Commission, for its part, remained “fully 
associated”,25 with the exact meaning of that phrase again left to the common discretion of Member 
States. Together with the latter, the Commission was also accorded the right to put forward policy 
initiatives.26 However, it has been reticent to use this right, reflecting “both awareness of Member 
State sensitivities and resentment at its relative marginalization in the context of the CFSP”.27 It is 
therefore surprising that the only Treaty article that mentioned the Delegations was included in the 
CFSP Chapter, and accorded these bodies important responsibilities. Article 20 TEU states that: 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission delegations 
in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international 
organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions 
adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. 
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and 
contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
As the CFSP is per definition largely put in practice abroad, the assignment to ensure, in cooperation 
with Member States, that its decisions are complied with and implemented, is potentially a very large 
and demanding one. Given that the Commission is only distantly involved in CFSP decision-making in 
Brussels, it is regrettable that the actual modalities of its role abroad are in no way defined. The 
legally awkward consequence of inserting this provision was moreover that the only Treaty-defined 
responsibilities of Delegations were in the largely intergovernmental preserve of the CFSP, while 
their wide-ranging EC responsibilities appeared to be neglected. The only exception is their role to 
cooperate with Member States in implementing the provisions of Article 20 TEC, stating that every 
EU citizen in the territory of a third country shall be entitled to protection by the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of any Member State, another area closely linked to state sovereignty.  
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While the Commission Delegations thus showed ever more similarities to diplomatic missions, they 
disposed of noting comparable to a career foreign service. As argued by Carta the service abroad of 
Commission officials was more similar to a legion étrangère: “they were cut off from career 
possibilities within the Commission, untrained for the job and suffered extreme difficulties in 
communication with Headquarters in Brussels”.28 Already in 1982, a report to the Council on the 
external competences of the Community noted that “there is an inherent contradiction in the way in 
which ... outward postings are voluntary but come to a compulsory end without any guarantee of 
what will follow”.29 The creation of the External Unified Service (EUS) in 1993 came some way in 
meeting this discontent by finally setting up a unified administration for foreign staff with improved 
career guidance and instructions for external representation. With these reforms the Delegation 
network necessarily gave in on its autonomy. As noted by a former German Commission Delegate: 
“in the delegations where we used to be for a long time the absolute masters (des vrais patrons) in 
all administrative matters, we lost all our power and became like other members of our delegations, 
slaves of a rigid, nitty-gritty administrative system, a bitter pill to swallow at the end of our career, 
but necessary perhaps”.30 
Two sobering events at the end of the millennium underlined the remaining deficiencies of the 
Commission’s bureaucracy: the resignation of the Santer Commission over allegations of fraud, 
nepotism and mismanagement of aid 31  and the first ever official impact assessment of EU 
development assistance that marked down EU development policy for, among other, delayed and 
inefficient implementation with weak monitoring leading to a restricted and unsustainable impact on 
poverty alleviation.32 The new Prodi Commission, that took office in September 1999, consequently 
undertook a radical reform programme through a succession of communications that included 
multiple initiatives to professionalise and rationalise the network of Delegations. This process was set 
in motion through a June 1999 Communication on the External Service that included a mandatory 
system of staff rotation – improving the career possibilities of civil servants working in Delegations –, 
training arrangements and measures to second Member States diplomats to Delegations.33  
One of the most visible expressions of this new approach was a general deconcentration exercise,34 
transferring numerable posts from Brussels towards Delegations to shorten the lines of 
communication and improve the alignment of aid management with the local context.35 As a sort of 
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internal EU subsidiarity the Commission explained that: “[a]nything that can be better managed and 
decided on the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, should not be managed or decided in 
Brussels”.36 As noted by the European Convention deconcentration (or also “devolution) in practice 
“means that Delegations contribute with their opinion to the programming process, manage the 
operational cycle and have direct responsibility for identification of projects”.37 Consequently, Heads 
of Delegation found themselves overnight in charge of a significantly larger staff with entirely new 
responsibilities in resource management.  
In conclusion, the Commission Delegations emerged in an EEC Treaty framework where external 
relations provisions were few and far between, and the need for such bodies was thus initially not 
felt. Arguably, it was precisely this legal void that facilitated the mushrooming of Commission offices 
around the globe. Combined with the geographical distance and informality of this process, this 
created a certain autonomy from the Brussels Headquarters that smoothened the gradual expansion 
of their tasks and responsibilities, in line with the Community’s growing competences.38 The Treaty of 
Maastricht made an end to the legal void, yet strangely enough not by codifying previous practice, 
but by according the Delegations vague responsibilities under the CFSP, an area dominated by the 
Member States where the Commission is generally perceived as an outsider. It was only in the late 
1990s and 2000s that the Commission started the genuine formalisation and professionalisation of 
its network, that simultaneously put a significant brake on the autonomy of its Delegations.  
2.2. Commission Delegations and EU external relations: diplomacy by 
default 
Arguably, the Commission did not intend to become a diplomatic actor. Rather, being the only 
permanent EU presence in situ, the Delegations evolved by default and on demand to fulfil specific 
needs. In this manner they were gradually charged with ever more responsibilities, turning them 
from centers of technical expertise into a “quasi-diplomatic service”.39 Consequently, its inclusion in 
the global diplomatic community – based on the rules and rights of the VCDR – became a necessary 
condition for their effective functioning.40 Yet, “[a]cting without a clear foreign policy, without a head 
of state, with limited resources and without professional diplomats, the external delegations of the 
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Commission [were] deprived of most of what traditionally unifies and consolidates foreign 
services”.41  
Moreover, in a traditionally inter-state diplomatic system, the emergence of this new actor gave rise 
to legally unorthodox situations with regard to the status of its staff as well as to who or what they 
exactly represented. As clarified by the Council in 2010, the Commission Delegations essentially 
“represented the positions and competences of the European Commission exclusively and were not 
delegations representing the European Community”,42 let alone the European Union. Yet, the nitty-
gritty of the EU’s internal organization is not always clear to third countries. Through a survey of 
Mexican local media Bruter for instance found that in 73% of the cases the Commission Delegation 
was perceived as representing the EU or even Europe in general.43  
This was not just a matter of perception. Also in actual practice this legal delimitation started to fade. 
This is evidenced in the foreword of a 2004 Commission brochure from the hand of its President 
Prodi and the External Relations Commissioner Patten – i.e. the patrons of the External Service – 
stating that “[t]hese diplomatic representations are essential to the promotion of European Union 
interests and values around the world, and are in the front line in delivering EU external relations 
policy and action, from the common foreign and security policy through trade and development 
cooperation to scientific and technical relations”.44  
Yet, Member States kept a close eye on this evolution. They activated a kind of ‘diplomatic fire-alarm’ 
to notify the Commission when Heads of Delegation trespassed their competences and reminded 
them discretely, albeit unmistakably, of the boundaries to their radius of action.45 That the 
Commission was susceptible for such sensitivities is clearly illustrated by the following quote from a 
1991 Commission note to its Delegates:  
May I remind you – and ask you to remind your staff – of the need to exercise the greatest tact 
and discretion ... above all in relation to diplomatic titles and diplomatic precedence. [You 
should not] seek to impose the title Ambassador. If interlocutor fails to use this courtesy title, 
Head of Delegation should not pursue matter. He should discourage his own staff from 
referring to him as ‘the Ambassador’. ... In particular, the appellation ‘Ambassador of the 
European Community’ should be avoided. For time being, Commission delegations remain 
Commission delegations – not Community delegations – even though they may in practice 
represent the Community on questions falling within areas of exclusive competence. One 
cannot expect average diplomat in street [sic] to understand such subtleties.
46 
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This could not prevent the Commission network from being criticised, particularly in UK Eurosceptic 
press, as created by stealth or illegal.47 Even the former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw disparaged 
these Delegations as “all sorts of odd-bods from the European Union running all sorts of odd offices 
around the world”.48 On the other hand, many Member States’ diplomats valued the expertise of 
these Commission Delegations, particularly in trade negotiations, managing large scale aid 
programmes, as well as their impressive network of contacts with grassroots organisations that this 
brought along.49 With regard to the exercise of the Presidency abroad this often caused a delicate 
“pas de deux” between the Commission Delegation and the respective national embassy.50 Member 
States were stuck in the middle between the welcomed Commission assistance – with the latter 
often carrying out a sort of shadow-Presidency for smaller states51 – and the temptation of using the 
Presidency to push through their national agenda. 
The fact that Commission Delegations became EU diplomatic actors by matter-of-fact default also 
meant that they were not always suited or sufficiently equipped for the tasks at hand. In particularly 
staffing levels remained too low and while training was gradually scaled-up it was still rudimentary 
compared to that of traditional career foreign services. In essence, the management culture of 
Delegations always stayed one of project management rather than diplomacy.52  
This mismatch of competences and design was most striking with regard to their vaguely defined 
responsibilities under the CFSP. In a speech to the 2003 Conference of Heads of Delegation, Prodi left 
no doubt that the Treaty of Maastricht had made the latter “ – who put the EU’s common foreign 
and security policy into practise abroad — indispensable instruments in the EU’s expanding role on 
the international stage”.53 The 2004 Commission brochure on its External Service provided limited 
further insights in what this task involved, namely “providing regular political analysis, conducting 
evaluations jointly with Member State embassies and contributing to the policy-making process”.54 
Further, Commission Delegations assisted in the preparation of visits by the High Representative and 
cooperated with EU Special Representatives (EUSR) that were appointed to the country or region in 
which they were present. Not seldom they were therefore seen in their host states as representing 
the policies that these CFSP actors represented and held accountable for their consequences. As a 
herald of the creation of a double-hatted High Representative/Commission Vice-President by the 
Lisbon Treaty, the functions of EUSR and Head of Commission Delegation were combined in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to the African Union. In other cases the division of 
labour between these two functions remained rather muddied. Moreover, given the very limited 
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number of staff with a political profile (most Delegations did not have a political section), the lack of 
secure lines of communications and the restrained access to intelligence networks, the Delegations 
were poorly equipped for the culture of confidentiality that reigned foreign and security matters.55  
This was even more worrisome in the context of European Security and Defence Police (ESDP) 
missions, the success of which entirely depends on the confidence of host states. The ESDP, that was 
declared operational at the 2001 Laeken European Council,56 provided a new extension to the 
Delegations’ portfolio. While the nature of this task was nowhere defined, it was evident that in 
countries where an ESDP mission or operation was deployed, it could not act in isolation from the 
Commission Delegation. Consequently, Joint Actions setting up the latter required “close 
coordination” between the Commission Delegation and the Head of such a mission “without 
prejudice to the chain of command”.57 The implementation of this vague duty was however left to 
the discretion of the personalities that held these posts. Whilst there was no form of hierarchy in this 
undertaking, each Head of a civilian mission was – in a typical case of EU intricacy - obliged to “report 
fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission”,  that manages the budget of such missions, 
“regarding the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract”. 58  The difficulty of 
coordination was in fact part of a broader problem that complicated the implementation of EU 
policies. EU institutions increasingly developed broad frameworks and strategies to enhance the 
coherence and exploit synergies between various external policies, for instance in the field of the 
security-development nexus,59 but the lack of strong decentralised actors severely hampered the 
translation of these complex processes to the field.  
3. Union Delegations: a new actor on the scene? 
3.1. Entangling the nature, composition and competences of EU 
Delegations 
The idea of creating a genuine diplomatic system is not new and particularly the European 
Parliament had been an active proponent of this cause.60 The “large consensus” to establish EU 
delegations/embassies, as well as an EU diplomatic academy (that eventually did not see the light of 
day) and an EU diplomatic service, was first expressed by the Working Group on External Action of 
the European Convention.61 The conviction that the “Commission's delegations would become EU 
delegations” did finally not make it in the Lisbon Treaty, with Article 221 TFEU merely stating that: 
1. Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent the 
Union. 
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2. Union delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They shall act in close cooperation with Member 
States’ diplomatic and consular missions. 
Yet, given that the Commission itself found that its network was “ideally placed to ensure the success 
of this ambitious and far-reaching proposal”, the logical decision to build further on what was already 
in place was quickly taken.62 With the insertion of this one Article the Lisbon Treaty finally gave 
Delegations the legal recognition they had been missing the last half century. No longer could these 
offices be dismissed as illegal or “expected to be models of secretion and self-effacement”.63 As a 
logical extension of the dissolution of the Community into the Union, and the accordance of a single 
legal personality to the EU,64 the Delegations now represented the Union as a whole, including its 
entire range of competences. This was an important step forward, but in the absence of any further 
Treaty guidance, it raised more questions than it answered. Besides the responsibility to represent 
the Union and act in close cooperation with Member States, Article 221 TFEU clarifies nothing in 
terms of the Delegations’ general nature, role and composition. If the EEAS provisions of Article 27(3) 
had already been criticised as particularly meagre,65 these at least provided for a Council decision to 
establish its organisation and functioning. Despite the importance of creating Union Delegations, that 
would more than ever insert the EU in the global diplomatic community and thus constituted one of 
the most visible Lisbon innovations for outside actors, their functioning was entirely left in the open.  
Similarly to the previous Treaty framework, it was again the CFSP Chapter that provided some more 
information on the role of these Delegations. In addition to the old tasks of cooperating with 
Member States’ missions to ensure that CFSP positions and actions, as well as the provisions on 
consular protection, are complied with and implemented, two new specifications were made.66 The 
first is mainly textual but signals a stronger recognition of their role. The obligation on Member 
States’ missions and Union Delegations to “step up cooperation by exchanging information and 
carrying out joint assessments” is no longer attached to the provisions on consular protection, but 
inserted as a separate paragraph, signalling a broader scope. Second, the Lisbon Treaty expands the 
duty of Member States to “inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of 
foreign and security policy of general interest”, that was set out in ex Article 16 TEU, with an 
obligation to “determine a common approach”.67  Member States’ diplomatic missions and Union 
delegations are subsequently tasked to cooperate and contribute to formulating and implementing 
this common approach. This is a potentially heavy assignment, but one should not forget that the 
CFSP remains a largely intergovernmental area that evolves on the pace of unanimous decisions in 
the Council and the European Council. As the Parliament, Commission and Court are only accorded 
very limited roles, the responsibility for compliance and enforcement is left to the Member States.  
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The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, overnight transforming the old 
Commission Delegations into Union Delegations. One month later, a number of these Delegations 
already held the “responsibility of representation and coordination on behalf of the EU”, with 
transitory arrangements applicable in other places.68 It took however another seven months before a 
first attempt was made to lift some of the shroud on their nature, role and composition. In the 
absence of any Treaty guidance on this process, this was done through a separate Article 5 on Union 
Delegations in the Council Decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS.69  
A first issue that this elucidated was the undefined nature of EU Delegations in the Union’s 
institutional architecture. Article 1(4) establishes them as an integral part of the EEAS. This seemingly 
logical decision was however not self-evident and moreover not fully in line with the letter of the 
Treaty. In strict legal terms, the latter establishes the EEAS as a CFSP body, set out under the 
dedicated TEU Chapter, while the Delegations represent the Union as a whole. Consequently, other 
institutional designs were conceivable. Spence indicates that a possible set-up could have divided 
these bodies into a political/CFSP section headed by an ambassador representing the EU, and a 
technical project management service under the leadership of a deputy ambassador responsible for 
former first pillar external policies (now set out in the TFEU).70 Compared to such a fragmented 
design, its unitary construction and   inclusion in the EEAS is certainly organisationally logical and in 
line with the Treaty’s objective of enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action.71 
Yet, it may “have resolved one set of institutional 'boundary' issues at the expense of creating 
another”.72 The fact that the Union Delegations have a broader range of competences than their 
mother institution, the EEAS, leads to complex and potentially conflicting situations with regard to 
the composition of staff, the chains of command and the financial circuits.  
First, EEAS staff occupies all posts of Head and Deputy Head of Delegation, and support staff directly 
attached to them, as well as all staff of political, information, public diplomacy and administration 
sections.73 Additionally, the Delegations comprise of Commission officials “where appropriate for the 
implementation of the Union budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the 
EEAS".74 This staff continues to figure on the establishment plan of their home DGs. Given that the 
EEAS has only limited responsibilities in development cooperation and neighbourhood policy, and no 
competence over trade and enlargement, Commission officials largely outnumber those from the 
EEAS in many places. In July 2013 there were about 5460 staff working in Delegations, with 3500 
being Commission officials and 1960 EEAS personnel.75 Of the latter group only 365 are officials 
(administrators  or AD-level), with the remainder mainly local agents, but also contractual agents, 
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assistants and seconded national experts (SNE’s).76 Authority over all staff “whatever their status, 
and for all its activities” is entrusted to the Head of Delegation.77 The latter shall receive instructions 
from the High Representative – to whom the she/he is accountable – and the EEAS, and shall be 
responsible for their execution.78  
Also the Commission may, in areas where it exercises the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, 
issue instructions to Delegations “which shall be executed under the overall responsibility of the 
Head of Delegation”.79 These provisions left open a number of delicate questions that were further 
addressed in separate documents. The Working Arrangements between the Commission and the 
EEAS specify that these instructions must be issued through the Heads of Delegation, copying the 
EEAS, who shall than call on the relevant staff to carry them through.80 A Service Level Agreement  
(SLA) further prescribes that Commission staff shall receive the necessary services from the EEAS – 
subject to at least the same standards of quality that it accords to its own staff – in order to allow 
them to carry out their responsibilities.81 In a provision that that tends more towards an expression 
of mistrust than mutual agreement, “[t]he Commission can, on its own initiative, and after due notice, 
undertake on the spot visits to Delegations in order to satisfy itself that the present agreement is 
correctly implemented”.82  
Whereas the Delegations thus finally form part of a single EU external service, their central 
administration is still split. As expressed by the Court “the legal status of the Union Delegations is 
characterized by a two-fold organic and functional dependence with respect to the EEAS and the 
Commission”.83 The Head of Delegation may have authority over all staff, the ultimate supervisors of 
Commission staff in Delegations are located in their respective services in Brussels. Whereas this 
situation is not so dissimilar from national embassies that include personnel from various line 
ministries, the proportion of this staff category is exceptional. Moreover, the Heads of Delegation 
have limited authority over Commission staff in their service, and as recognized by the EEAS’ 
Executive Secretary-General Pierre Vimont “struggled to control [this] group of people”,84 putting a 
strain on their general leverage. 
Strangely enough the idea of parallel universes within the EU Delegations was strengthened by High 
Representative Ashton, who justified the limitations of the Delegations in North Africa as follows: 
“[r]emember that in most delegations the staff who are [EEAS] may be only one. The rest are 
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Commission development people doing fantastic work, but they are not mine”.
85
 Not only is this 
statement remarkable because the High Representative stands directly above the Head of 
Delegation who has authority over all its staff, it moreover seems to neglect her double-hat as 
Commission Vice-President. The not unlikely possibility of disputes in managing these complex staff 
relations is acknowledged in the SLA and is set to be addressed at the level of Director-Generals 
“with a view to finding an amicable solution”.86  
Less details are provided on how the Heads of Delegations are to manage their split loyalty that 
arises from this two-fold organic and functional dependence. As the only figure within an EU 
Delegation, its Head wears a dual Commission-EEAS hat. Arguably, this resulted more from practical 
necessity than actual design. Being EEAS officials, Heads of Delegation could otherwise not sign off 
the EU’s aid instruments, that continue to be managed by the Commission.87 Consequently, the latter 
was authorised to sub-delegate its responsibility for budget appropriations and implementation to 
the Heads of Delegation.88 When acting as sub-delegated authorising officer for such operational 
expenditure, the Head “must apply the Commission rules and be subject to the same duties, 
obligations and accountability as any other sub-delegated authorising officer of the Commission”.89  
Adding to the complexity, the Delegations’ administrative budget constitutes an entirely separate 
financial circuit for which the Head is accountable to the EEAS. The Working Arrangements 
acknowledge the potential for a “conflict of priorities”, but provide no solution besides the vague 
prescription that the Head of Delegation will inform the Commission and the EEAS, who  “will take 
appropriate step to remedy the situation”.90 This intricacy, of both the line management and the 
budget handling risks to complicate the daily operation of EU Delegations. Yet, arguably, this was the 
price to pay for their comprehensive design and scope that transcends the competence limitations 
existing at headquarters level.  
The Union Delegations do not only stand at the service of the EEAS and the Commission, they “shall 
have the capacity to respond to the needs of other institutions of the Union, in particular the 
European Parliament”.91 Adding to this function as EU ‘administrative assistants’ – that led some 
within the Delegations to complain that they had been turned into “travel agents”,92 they “shall work 
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in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States”.93 
Given that this element of sharing information is established as a unilateral duty upon the 
Delegations,94 it is not entirely surprising that Member States’ missions have often stayed passive 
receptors.95 Gradually, the tide is turning and Member States are jumping on the bandwagon of EU 
information exchange. On the one hand, this has a very practical cause, namely the unfolding of a 
security transmission system, called ACID. The absence hereof severely complicated the interchange 
of intelligence. This is evidenced by the fact that most Delegation staff agree that the oral exchange 
of information has occurred with much greater regularity.96 On the other hand, reciprocity in such a 
sensitive exercise requires trust, something that is gradually being built up, as the quality of the 
Delegations’ reporting is improving.97 The wide access to EU-made information and intelligence is 
one of the clearest added values that the Union Delegations can provide, particularly to smaller 
Member States with a limited global presence.98  However, no unified reporting model is in place and 
great disparity exists in the way reports are being drafted and shared.99  
The single most important extension of the Delegations’ range of duties results from the Treaty-
defined task to represent to Union. This has been interpreted as encompassing not only the 
demanding task of in-country coordination, but also the important representative functions taken 
over from the rotating Presidency.100 As a consequence, the whole range of EU coordination 
meetings, including the typically monthly gatherings of Heads of Mission (HoMs), Deputy HoMs, 
Economic Counsellors, Development Counsellors, etc. are now chaired by the EU Delegations and 
generally held at its premises. Even though this holds the risk of loosing the dynamism inserted by 
the alternating presidencies, it is undoubtedly beneficial for the continuity of the EU’s approach. It 
moreover provides its partners with a clear EU face and interlocutor on the ground. Disregarding 
some early teething problems,101 the High Representative assesses this transfer of responsibilities as 
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“remarkably smoothly in bilateral delegations and … welcomed by third countries”.102 Moreover, 
76,5 % of staff in Delegations judge local coordination as excellent to very good.103 Observers 
generally share this analysis, yet point to considerable variations between locations, partly 
dependent on interpersonal relations, the (geo)strategic importance of the respective country or 
topic (with the ease of coordination inversely proportional to the strategic importance due to 
increasing Member States’ sensitivities), as well as the background, experience and level of initiative 
of the Heads of Delegations.104  
These changes required new working methods and, after consultations with Member States, 
Guidelines for EU co-operation in third countries and Guidelines on EU Political Demarches were 
circulated in November 2011. 105  These documents put forward the Union Delegations as 
undisputable leaders in representing EU positions and stress that any role accorded to Member 
States should be exceptional. Yet, in actual fact, Member States still participate in about one third of 
EU demarches, undermining the clarity of EU external representation which the Lisbon Treaty aimed 
to improve.106 In this same reasoning it is confusing and contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, that the 
Working Arrangements prescribe that “[in] meetings at official level, the non-CFSP EU position can be 
presented either by the EU Delegation or by Commission officials”.107  
Gradually, EU Delegations’ relations with Member States missions are moving beyond informing, 
coordinating and representing, towards genuine cooperation. Contrary to the past situation where 
budget limitations led Member States to pursue individual rather than cooperative solutions,108 the 
awareness is rising about the advantages of enhancing cooperation at EU level. There are a number 
of different ways in which this occurs. First, there is the practice of co-location, meaning that 
Member States’ so-called ‘laptop diplomats’, that have no representation in a certain country, are 
placed within the premises of an EU Delegation. Since the creation of the EEAS such projects have 
been set up with eleven Member States in seven third countries.109 A second form of cooperation is 
that of sharing embassy premises. The Luxemburg embassy to Ethiopia is for instance established on 
the compound of the EU Delegation.110 Third, sub-contracting opens economies of scale by sharing 
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certain services. The idea has for instance been advanced to set up joint contracts for the provision 
of security services abroad. Finally, by virtue of the EEAS Decision, the EU Delegations shall, upon 
request by Member States, support the latter States in their diplomatic relations and in their role of 
providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries “on a resource-neutral basis”. 
Recently, this was rather successfully put in practice in Syria, where the EU Delegation was 
deliberately kept open to continue such services while Member States were closing their 
representations in reacting to severe human rights violations by the Syrian government and the rising 
insecurity.111 Yet, given that his has to occur on a resource neutral basis, EEAS staff is cautioning that 
they lack the resources for expanding such activity.112 This points to a general problem for the EU 
Delegations, that as integral part of the EEAS, should “be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency 
aiming towards budget neutrality”.113 The High Representative therefore argues in the 2013 EEAS 
review that “savings in national budgets should be a factor in setting the level of resources for the 
EEAS”.114 Whereas all the above forms of cooperation are mechanisms of practical and pragmatic 
interaction, they provide important steps towards genuine diplomatic, and thereby foreign policy 
integration. 
3.2. EU Delegations as quasi-embassies: are they up to the task? 
With their broad design EU Delegations constitute quasi-embassies that compared to their national 
counterparts only lack military, consular and cultural sections.115 They are moreover considered as 
embassies for all practical diplomatic purposes, with the only voids in the almost complete 
applicability of the VCDR to EU-third state relations116 being the lack of EU diplomatic passports and 
the difficulties with granting diplomatic asylum to persons in need.117 This also implies that the Head 
of Delegation is required to act – and increasingly perceived – as a quasi-ambassador. Similar to 
standard diplomatic practice the third state to which the Delegation is accredited is requested in an 
accreditation letter, signed by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission, to “give 
entire credence to all that he will communicate … in accordance with the instructions of the 
European Union”.118 Even the taboo on using the term ‘ambassador’ in reference to Heads of 
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Delegation is gradually breaking and is ever more frequently used in diplomatic correspondence.119 
This reflects a growing recognition of the standing of these Delegations in the diplomatic community.  
The ability of the Heads of Delegation to deal with these increased responsibilities and expectations 
depends as much on their personality as on their background. Seconded national experts (SNEs) 
generally have more affiliation with diplomatic sensitivities than those with a Commission 
background, but may struggle with the Delegations’ traditionally more administrative tasks and 
technical projects. As a matter of fact, this last element is claiming a disproportionately large share in 
their already dense schedules. Since the transformation from Commission to EU Delegations, their 
Heads can no longer delegate the daily management of assistance programmes to their deputies or 
senior Commission staff, meaning that they can only themselves sign off on even the smallest 
transactions. This problem is acknowledged as one of “paramount importance” to be solved “in the 
shortest possible timescale” in the EEAS Review, but the High Representative – who again seems to 
forget her second hat – passes the buck to the Commission, because the EEAS cannot make 
proposals of a legislative nature.120  
In her/his leadership the Head of Delegation appears to be challenged from within by the EU Special 
Representatives. Whilst the Treaty only prescribes, in the vaguest of terms, that these shall have “a 
mandate in relation to particular policy issues”,121 they have in practice nearly all been appointed to 
coordinate EU policies towards a certain country or region.122 Particularly this last category seems to 
be on the rise, given that the EU is increasingly taking a regional approach to foreign policy, as 
evidenced for instance by the strategies for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.123 Seen that the 
mechanisms for cooperation and information-sharing between Delegations in the same region are 
fairly limited, the Special Representatives can fill an important void. In this regard, and in the light of 
the Lisbon Treaty’s call for a more unified external voice, it is striking that their role is completely 
absent in the EEAS Decision. The division of tasks and responsibilities is nowhere addressed, leading 
“to parallel lines of reporting and confusion about who was in charge”.124  
The EEAS Review acknowledges that the Special Representatives, “being housed in a separate 
building with a relationship primarily to the Member States through the [Peace and Security 
Committee]”, have only limited contacts with the Delegations.125 It purports to solve this legal 
anomaly by integrating them more closely in the EEAS structures. It has in this light been suggested 
to built upon the existing practice of double-hatting Heads of Delegations and Special 
Representatives, as it is currently done in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
African Union.126 There is however a strong paradox here: whereas this double-hatting can only work 
where the geographic focus of both functions overlap, one may wonder which added value the 
Special Representative can offer in that case to a Head of Delegation that represents and coordinates 
all EU action.  
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As noted by an EEAS official in Delegation, since the Lisbon Treaty “politics is no longer a hobby, that 
could be performed with relatively limited oversight from Brussels, but has become part and parcel 
of every aspect of the Delegations’ daily business, couched in a formal straightjacket under strict 
supervision from both headquarters and Member States”.127 The fact that Delegations increasingly 
act, and are perceived, as embassies does not leave a simple aspect of their work unaffected. Even 
though politics had evidently never been far away in policy negotiations with partner governments, 
the new situation requires all staff to execute their responsibilities in a more politically sensitive 
manner. Moreover, the Arab Spring and the more recent turmoil in Ukraine, confronted the EU with 
the sobering fact that its policies must take the political situation in which they operate much more 
into account.  
A key question is to which extent the Union Delegations are up to this task. In essence, the increased 
expectations on what they should deliver, particularly with regard to the CFSP, were not 
accompanied by a commensurate expansion of their capacity. Indeed, “[m]any delegations have 
managed the transition without any additional resources”, thirteen Delegations, for instance, “have 
no political section, with the Head of Delegation the only AD official from the EEAS”.128 However, as 
long as the target of budget neutrality is not replaced “with a more realistic focus on budgetary 
efficiency”,129 the EEAS’ hands remain largely tied. A small but significant solution is the High 
Representative’s commitment to continue the transfer of posts from headquarters to Delegations to 
cope with their heavy workload.130 Further, the Delegations must make do with what they have. 
Regrettably, this often consists of understaffed and resourced political sections,131 which moreover 
partly consist of Commission staff that were – as prescribed in the Treaty and the EEAS Decision – re-
hatted to the latter, yet often without appropriate training.132  
As a positive sign of team spirit, a joint letter from the Commission Secretary-General and the EEAS 
Chief Operating Officer133 allow to cushion these shortfalls by a flexible use of staff, through which 
Commission personnel can contribute to political work. Yet, also the latter’s capacities are in many 
cases overstretched, which moreover prevents them from properly absorbing the relevant guidance 
and training required to exercise such tasks.134 Nonetheless, these arrangements are widely applied, 
with considerable variations as their use is at the discretion of the Head of Delegation. A major 
contribution to the diplomatic skills within EU Delegations is moreover delivered by the SNEs, that 
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constitute 46.2 % of their staff at AD level, including 44% of the Heads of Delegation.135 Further 
reinforcing this win-win situation for exchanging knowledge, information and contacts, there are 
concrete plans to relaunch the in 2007 created Diplomatic Exchange and Secondment Programme 
(DESP) that allows to second EU officials to national foreign ministries.136 Finally, Article 6(10) of the 
EEAS Decision makes staff rotation between Brussels and the field “in principle” an obligation for all 
EEAS staff, providing the basis for a genuine career foreign service. 
It is clear from the above that staff in Delegations is extremely diverse. Besides the internally 
diversified EEAS staff and Commission officials, there are various personnel categories ranging from 
administrators over assistants, temporary agents, contract agents to local staff. The chains of 
command, career paths and training opportunities are very different from one status to another. 
Despite the clear risk to magnify the widely reported hurdles to create a common esprit de corps in 
the EEAS headquarters,137 an ECDPM study reports that after a first phase of transition staff relations 
are now generally productive and constructive.138 Moreover, staff in Delegations generally value the 
“biodiversity” of their new working environment.139 However, not everything in the garden is rosy 
and as noted in the EEAS Review there remains considerable room for improvement in resource 
management.140 Substantial tension arises over the fact that the Commission has duplicated the 
working group “EUDEL”, that manages contacts between the EEAS and the Commission on staff in 
Delegations, with its own “COMDEL” to coordinate between the various Commission services with 
staff abroad. This remaining fragmentation is further illustrated by the fact that the Commission is 
pushing to have its own officials, rather than those of the EEAS, on the posts of deputy Heads of 
Delegation.141 
In general, efforts are clearly being made to fill the gaps in the design of EU Delegations, but political 
expertise remains an area of concern. This is even more so with regard to specific security expertise, 
particularly relating to CSDP activity. While coordination with CSDP missions and operations had 
always been a requirement, it is new that the Head of Delegation is now expected to take the lead. 
The mandates of EUTM Mali and EUCAP Nestor for instance state that “[t]he Head of Mission shall, 
without prejudice to the chain of command, receive local  political guidance from the Head of Union 
Delegation”.142 This suggests, at least on the level of politics, some form of hierarchical relationship 
between EU Delegations and CSDP missions. Such guidance can however not be effective without 
significant knowledge and understanding of the CSDP specificities, as well as the security climate in a 
certain country or region.  
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The CSDP is however the single most sensitive area of EU cooperation, under strict surveillance by 
the Member States. This is evidenced by the fact that Defence Attachés meetings are the only EU 
gathering abroad that continues to be chaired by the Member States, with the Delegations’ political 
officers only occasionally invited. On the other hand, when a CSDP mission is present in a given 
country the Head of Mission or Force Commander typically attends HoMs meetings at the EU 
Delegation. 143  Consequently, relevant expertise is only to a very limited extent available in 
Delegations and the EEAS Review pleads to improve the availability of security and military 
personnel.144 For this purpose it commits to expand an initialled pilot programme of detaching 
security and military experts to Delegations, as well as to improve synergies between geographical 
experts in the EEAS Intelligence Centre and the relevant Delegations.   
Growing pains are inevitable for these new quasi-EU embassies. Yet, there appears to be a clear 
commitment within the EU to make them work effectively. With the proper staffing and resources 
these Delegations offer unique opportunities to translate the EU's widely-portrayed coherence 
rationale into needs-oriented and inclusionary action on the ground. Particularly in developing 
countries they have a wide network of contacts through implementing the EU’s various aid 
programmes, that allow them to act as antennae to monitor the local context “beyond the usual 
government-to-government diplomacy”.145 For instance, during the Mali crisis the Union Delegation 
was better informed than any Member States due to its wide contacts with grassroots 
organisations.146 In order to fully reap the benefits of these comprehensive Delegations, they need to 
be able to feed into both EU decision-making and its implementation.  
Rather to the contrary staff in Delegations complain about top-down decisions that fail to take into 
account their input and advice, for instance with regard to the choice of priority sectors in aid 
programming.147  Not only does this undermine their relations with and the trust of authorities, 
businesses and civil society, it is also fails to fully exploit the potential for aligning EU initiatives with 
local needs and requirements. Focussing on fragile states, the European Parliament therefore 
proposes to further devolve decision-making to Delegations and enable a more flexible use of 
resources.148 The EDF for instance provides a budget for unforeseen needs, but it can only be 
allocated after the government or any other relevant organisation of the country concerned submits 
a request, that will be assessed by the Delegation, subsequently forwarded to the EEAS for further 
examination, transmitted to DG DEVCO to check the availability of funds and the eligibility of the 
intervention, who then finally prepares an Implementing Decision in consultation with the EEAS.149 
The Parliament therefore adds that more deconcentration and flexibility may “require a change in 
the culture of the Commission from instructing and controlling Delegations to providing timely 
resources and support to do their work”.150 In this respect it is regrettable that budgetary cuts are 
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limiting the number of travels from Brussels-based officials to Delegations, as this may further widen 
the gap between decision-making and the local context.151 
4. Conclusion 
The EU Delegations have come a long way from technical information and project management 
offices to full-scale representations of the EU. While they were formally merely Commission offices 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in actual fact they became EU diplomatic actors by 
default in reply to specific and evolving needs. Consequently, not a single area of EU competence 
was entirely foreign to them, not even the traditionally sensitive areas of the CFSP and the CSDP. 
Their evolving scope and reach had however always been dominated by managerial rather than 
political aspects,152 and it is precisely this element that changed with the Lisbon Treaty.  
By charging the Delegations with the task to represent the Union abroad, politics pervade every 
aspect of their daily functioning. By taking over the coordinating and representing responsibilities 
from the rotating Presidency, the Delegations hold great potential to unify and amplify the EU’s voice 
and provide partners with a single interlocutor abroad. While the Commission Delegations were 
better prepared for this transformation than a literal interpretation of their status would suggest, 
this nonetheless implied that this was much more than a nameplate operation. Whereas politics had 
always played a role in the work of these initially more technical Delegations, the Commission had 
never unfolded anything similar to a career diplomatic services, with the associated trainings, 
requirements ands standards for its staff.  Today, they are however expected to run quasi-embassies 
with hardly any additional resources. This obviously limits their capacity for political reporting, 
monitoring the security situation and practicing full and broad diplomatic tact and strategy, which 
are among the clearest areas of value added the Delegations can deliver.  
While many challenges thus remain, the first signs are considerably more positive than the 
annihilating criticisms that characterised the early days of the EEAS. This is all the more remarkable 
given that the broader competences, more diverse staff and complex lines of authority and reporting 
would seem to offer even more potential for tensions. Yet, rather to the contrary turf sensitivities 
appear less present as exemplified by the inter-institutional agreement that lets Commission officials 
contribute to the political tasks of the overburdened EEAS staff.  This illustrates the particularly clear 
awareness of the existing shortcomings in the Delegations and the determined commitment to fix 
them. Whereas this constitutes an interesting area for further research – particularly from a political 
scientists perspective – we can already pinpoint a number of elements that might explain this 
difference.   
First, while the political direction over EU external action is in Brussels divided between the two 
bureaucracies of the Commission and the EEAS, with the High Representative lacking the necessary 
clout to bridge them, the Head of Delegation provides more unified leadership on the ground. As 
noted above, this leadership is complicated by her/his divided loyalty to these two bureaucracies and 
to a certain extent challenged where an EU Special Representative is present. Second, the fact that 
these changes within the EU Delegations occurred out of spotlight – partly due to the geographical 
distance from Brussels – allowed them to gradually mature without every mishap or quarrel being 
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magnified under the public microscope. Third, the clarity and simplification that results from 
centralising EU coordination and representation in the Delegations is welcomed by third parties that 
appreciate the cost and time-savings this brings along.153 This appreciation results in a greater 
reliance upon the EU as interlocutor for the whole of its Member States, feeding back to the role and 
status of the Delegations. Fourth, also with regard to Member States the Delegations are increasingly 
seen as an added value rather than a threat to their foreign policy prerogatives. Member States have 
a clear interest in ensuring that EU reporting from all distant corners of the world is up to standard 
and can benefit from practical cooperation modalities such as co-location and sub-contracting. It is 
consequently not surprising that SNEs have provided the single most important contribution to the 
much-needed diplomatic expertise within EU Delegations. This has however not (yet) reached the 
point that Member States are prepared to invest more resources in the Delegations, to compensate 
for the cost savings at national level. Finally, there is a strong feeling among staff in Delegations that 
they have to make this work in order to improve their standing vis-à-vis, and influence on decision-
making in, Brussels headquarters.  
This last element is one of the main sticking points for Delegations. With their all-encompassing focus 
and competences they form the key to translating all the talk about the EU’s comprehensive 
approach into needs-oriented and context-specific policies. For this purpose the EU needs to set up a 
much more bottom-up process of policy design, wherein the Delegations can have an important in 
both the starting and end point of decision-making in order to fine-tune policies with the ever-
changing local circumstances and requirements.  
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